THE SITUATION 



FAR EAST 



BARON KENTARO KANEKO, LL.D. 



An Address delivered before Harvard University 

under the auspices of the Japan Club of 

Harvard at Sanders Theatre 

April 28^ I go 4 



I 



CAMBRIDGE 

The Japan Club of Harvard University 

MCMIV 



THE SITUATION 

IN THE 

FAR EAST 

BY 

BARON KENTARO KANEKO, LL.D. 



An Address delivered before Harvard University 

under the auspices of the Japan Club of 

Harvard at Sanders 'theatre 

April 28^ igo^ 



CAMBRIDGE 

The Japan Club of Harvard University 

MCMIV 






Gift. 



Prefc 



ace 



Baron Kentaro Kaneko delivered a learned 
address on " The Situation in the Far East " 
before a large and distinguished audience in 
Sanders Theatre of Harvard University, under 
the auspices of the Japan Club of Harvard, on 
April 28, 1904. All those who heard the address 
were deeply impressed with the righteousness of 
Japan's cause and the dignity and fairness of her 
position in the present struggle against Russian 
duplicity and arrogance in the extreme East. 
Japan's attitude was so ably and eloquently pre- 
sented by Baron Kaneko that many of those who 
heard him requested that he put it into per- 
manent form, and so make it accessible to the 
general public. Accordingly the Japan Club 
takes pleasure in printing the address with Baron 
Kaneko's permission, in order to meet the earnest 
wishes of their friends. 

Cambridge, May 16, 1904. 



The Situation in the Far East 



Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: 

I FEEL it to be the greatest honor ever con- 
ferred upon me that I am able to speak 
before so distinguished a gathering in the hall 
of this world-renowned University, of which I 
have always had most cherished memories. 

In the present struggle with Russia, the peace 
of Asia, as well as the national existence of 
Japan, is at stake. It is my desire in this address 
to reply to the charges Russia has made against 
us, as well as to deal with some of the doubts 
which some people have expressed concerning the 
motives actuating Japan. I propose to show not 
only that Japan did not declare war until tried 
to the last limit of human endurance, but that in 
taking so grave a step she was moved not by 
merely territorial, or even by purely national 
interests, but by the same aspirations towards the 
progress of the race as those which characterize 
Anglo-Saxon civilization the world over. 



2 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

But before entering into my subject, let me 
direct your attention for a moment to the history 
of our relation to Manchuria, for the Manchurian 
question is not merely a Russian question. At 
any rate, that part of Manchuria which is known 
as the Liaotung Peninsula was occupied by a 
Japanese army in the year 1895, during the war 
with China ; and when the war ended, those terri- 
tories were given to Japan by the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. We won them, remember, by force 
of arms — they came to us as spoils of victory. 
But what happened after the signing of that 
treaty ? Hardly was the ink dry on it before the 
three great European powers — Russia, France, 
and Germany — stepped in, and, in order to jus- 
tify their interference, declared that any holding 
of Manchurian territory by Japan would con- 
stitute a menace to the peace of Asia. Now 
consider in what situation that extraordinary 
announcement found us. We had just emerged 
from a costly, not to say ruinous, war. We had 
lost both blood and treasure. Our armies had 
been decimated and our battleships shattered. In 
this weakened condition we were suddenly con- 
fronted by a new and more powerful antagonist 
who, in the persons of Russia, France, and Ger- 
many, unceremoniously summoned us " to stand 
and deliver." Well, that was something like our 
situation; and as there was no choice for us, 
except between fighting and yielding, we had to 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 3 

submit to the demands of the three powers. In 
order to avert a supposed menace to the peace 
of Asia, we were compelled to give back to China 
the territories we had rightfully acquired. But 
that was only the beginning of the matter. In 
our simplicity, we imagined that those territories 
— that the Manchurian Peninsula — would re- 
vert to the Chinese Empire and remain an inte- 
gral part of it. It never entered into our heads 
to imagine that Russia would ultimately come 
into possession of them. Yet so it happened; 
for by way of diplomacy, Russia soon obtained 
in lease the very same region of the penin- 
sula which, after acquiring it with our armies, 
the three European powers had compelled us 
to return to China. Nor was it the end yet. 
Russia now made her preparations for the wait- 
ing game from which she had so much to expect ; 
all she needed was some incident in the progress 
of events that would enable her to completely 
Russianize the territory on which her foot had 
already been planted. Her opportunity came in 
1900 with the Boxer trouble, for Russia, availing 
herself of this outbreak of fanaticism in China, 
began to pour her troops into Manchuria, and 
did not desist until the whole of that province 
had been occupied. 

Once in possession, Russia never relinquished 
her hold on the territory, and her future plans 
regarding it have been repeatedly expressed by 



4 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

her diplomats in the phrase " fitly parallelling 
a former declaration of divine right, * There we 
are, and there we shall stay ! ' " 

And now what next? The Japanese have an 
undeniable faculty of observation, and for some 
years after that occupation we watched to see 
what Russia would do. It was not long before 
we found her building a railroad to the terminal 
point on the Liaotung Peninsula. Meanwhile, 
she fortified Port Arthur and almost doubled its 
strength as a strategical position; later we ob- 
served that she had converted the harbor of Port 
Arthur into a port which she exclusively reserved 
for the purposes of a Russian naval base by 
forbidding its use to the ships of other nations, 
and therefore to the commerce of the world. 
Then came Russia's extension of her Chinese 
Eastern Railroad towards the Yalu River, and 
the Korean frontier; her choice of Harbin as 
her headquarters and military base; and her 
erection of barracks along the lines of railroad 
in Manchuria. She had all the time been flood- 
ing the province with her soldiers, as well as 
taking other measures which obviously contem- 
plated its incorporation into the empire. Note- 
worthy also was the agreement by which she 
obtained the cession, from the government of 
Korea, of Yongampo on the southern bank of 
the Yalu River. Here was a characteristic bit 
of Russian diplomacy. Russia had the pretext 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 5 

of the enormous forest lands which she owns in 
the upper ranges of the Yalu, and she obtained 
Yongampo ostensibly as " a river basin " in 
which to receive her timber as it came down the 
stream. Last year, as a result of the concession 
to Russia, we had a good deal of trouble over 
Yongampo ; permission to land there was refused 
to one of our legation members in Seoul, and 
while the negotiations were going on, it was sus- 
pected that Russia intended to convert the place 
into a fortification. 

Now this occupation of Manchuria by Russia, 
together with Russia's manifest intention to ex- 
tend her influence into Korean territory, had a 
bearing on the interests of Korea and Japan that 
could not be ignored. Besides threatening the 
integrity and independence of Korea, they aimed 
at the rights and existing interests of Japan in 
Korea, and through these came to be a menace 
to^ our very existence as a nation. And it was 
this situation — recognized by the American and 
European governments as well as by Japan— that 
led us to open up negotiations with Russia, our 
object being to reach some peaceful arrange- 
ment, some amicable understanding, whereby all 
future trouble with her regarding Manchuria 
and Korea could be avoided. On July 28, there- 
fore, we addressed a diplomatic note to the 
Russian government containing the following : 
" The Imperial Japanese Government, believ- 



6 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

ing that the Imperial Russian Government share 
with them the desire to remove from the rela- 
tions of the two empires every cause of future 
misunderstanding, would be glad to enter with 
the Imperial Russian Government upon exam- 
ination of the condition of affairs in the extreme 
East, where their interests meet, with a view to 
defination of their respective special interests in 
those regions. If, as is confidently hoped, this 
suggestion meets approval in principle, the Im- 
perial Japanese Government will be prepared to 
present to the Imperial Russian Government their 
views as to the nature and scope of the proposed 
understanding/' 

This suggestion was carried out, the Russian 
government finally agreeing to open negotiations 
with Japan. The Japanese government there- 
upon drew up proposals as the basis of nego- 
tiations, and these proposals were submitted to 
Count Lamsdorff on August 12, 1903, it being 
clearly stated therein that the negotiations were 
to settle the matter relating to Manchuria and 
Korea. Then followed long delay on the part 
of Russia. During this we sent frequent notes, 
asking when we were to be informed of Russia's 
intentions, — we asked Russia many times what 
she intended to do, but she never gave a satis- 
factory answer. Sometimes she changed the 
seat of negotiations to Tokio, and did this in 
spite of protest. Even after the negotiations 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 7 

were thus transferred, she had to consult with 
many officials and dignitaries with the result of 
further delay, during all of which we waited in 
the hope of getting the desired reply. 

After full five months' delay, on December 11, 
1903, the Russian counter-proposals were re- 
ceived by our government. It was a surprise to 
us to find from these that Russia had stricken out 
Manchuria, and had confined herself entirely to 
Korea. Japan thereupon offered counter-pro- 
posals, restoring the omitted clauses bearing on 
Manchuria, and making her suggestions relate, 
as before, to both Manchuria and Korea. An- 
other delay ensued, and repeated requests for an 
early answer were made by the Japanese gov- 
ernment, but again without avail. 

What was Russia doing all this time ? On the 
one hand, beginning with last summer, she was 
negotiating for a peaceful settlement with Japan, 
and was continually expressing her hope that 
peace would result ; on the other, she was making 
warlike preparations on both land and sea, and 
these were almost appalling. We could not real- 
ize how a nation which expected to reach a peace- 
ful understanding could at the same time so 
openly prepare for war. The longer, in fact, we 
delayed, the more threatening became the situa- 
tion. We therefore addressed an ultimatum to 
the Russian government, asking them to give us 
a date on which we should receive their reply. 



8 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

As no definite answer came, we found our 
patience exhausted. They had refused satis- 
faction to our modest demand and reasonable 
proposals. Only one course was now open to us. 
That course our minister for foreign affairs took 
by addressing the following telegram, dated Feb- 
ruary 5, 1904, 2.15 P.M., to our minister at St. 
Petersburg : — 

" In the presence of delays which remain 
largely unexplained, and naval and military activ- 
ities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely 
pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exer- 
cised in the depending negotiations a degree of 
forbearance which they believe affords abundant 
proof of their loyal desire to remove from their 
relations with the Imperial Russian Government 
every cause for future misunderstanding. But 
finding in their efforts no prospect of securing 
from the Imperial Russian Government an adhe- 
sion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish 
proposals, or to any other proposals likely to 
establish a firm and enduring peace in the ex- 
treme East, the Imperial Government have no 
other alternative than to terminate the present 
futile negotiations. 

" In adopting that course the Imperial Govern- 
ment reserve to themselves the right to take such 
independent action as they may deem best to 
consolidate and defend their menaced position, 
as well as to protect their established rights and 
legitimate interests. 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 9 

" The Imperial Government of Japan, having 
exhausted without effect every means of con- 
ciliation with a view to the removal from their 
relations with the Imperial Russian Government 
of every cause for future complications, and 
finding that their just representations and mod- 
erate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a 
firm and lasting peace in the extreme East are 
not receiving the consideration which is their due, 
have resolved to sever their diplomatic relations 
with the Imperial Russian Government, which 
for the reason named have ceased to possess any 
value. 

" In further fulfilment of the command of his 
Government, the undersigned has also the honor 
to announce to His Excellency, Count Lamsdorff, 
that it is his intention to take his departure from 
St. Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial 
Legation." 

Note the date of the telegram, for it is very 
important: "February 5, 2.15 p.m." 

The message was handed over to Count Lams- 
dorff by our minister at St. Petersburg at 4 
o'clock in the afternoon of February 6. Si- 
multaneously our representative informed the 
Russian government that, in accordance with in- 
structions from Japan to leave the court of St. 
Petersburg, he should withdraw with his staff 
on the loth inst. Observe from the terms of this 
telegram that the Japanese government reserve 



lo THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

to themselves the right to take such independent 
action as they may deem best to consoHdate and 
defend their menaced position, as well as to 
protect their established rights and legitimate 
interests. So much for the negotiations which 
preceded the war ; and in dismissing them, let me 
add that these most difficult preliminaries were 
carried out by two Harvard men, — Baron Ko- 
mura and Mr. Kurino, the former our Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the latter our Minister to 
St. Petersburg. 

We now come to the outbreak of hostilities. 
Suitably to the declaration made in our final mes- 
sage to the Russian government, we began to 
move troops to Korea, and our transports, con- 
veyed by our torpedo boats and war vessels, 
reached the Bay of Chemulpo at 5 p. m. on Feb- 
ruary 8. 

On the arrival of our flotilla near that harbor 
we met the Russian war vessel Korietz. She 
made hostile demonstrations, and fired the first 
shot of the war at one of our torpedo boats, which 
thereupon returned the fire, but unfortunately 
without effect, — the enemy not being struck. The 
Korietz then returned to the inner harbor. On 
the following day, February 9, at 8 a.m., Rear- 
Admiral Uriu sent a letter to the captain of the 
Varyiag, challenging him to combat outside the 
harbor ; at the same time he addressed individual 
communications to the commanders of war ves- 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST it 

sels of the United States, England, Italy, and 
France, then at Chemulpo, requesting them, in 
ca^e the Variag and Koriets did not leave the 
harbor before noon, to change their anchorage. 
About II o'clock the same morning, the two 
Russian war vessels steamed from the harbor 
into open sea, and there, outside Chemulpo, began 
the first naval battle between Russia and Japan. 
Now let me state here one fact. Our squadron 
consisted of a large number of war ships, but our 
admiral ordered two only to meet the Variag 
and Korietz, the rest being required to remain 
at a distance, and not to take any part in the 
fighting. Finding themselves no match for their 
enemies, the Variag and Koriets returned into 
the harbor, where one sank and the other was 
blown up by the Russians. 

Now as this engagement outside Chemulpo 
has given rise to certain unwarranted assump- 
tions, I should Hke to remove them by a plain 
recital of facts. The Russian government claims 
that we violated international law in this battle 
by attacking our enemy in a neutral harbor. The 
very contrary is what happened, for Rear-Ad- 
miral Uriu scrupulously adapted his action to 
international usages in time of war by inviting 
the Russians to leave the harbor and try the issue 
on the open sea. If we look, therefore, to the 
facts, the charge that we violated international 
law, or even international precedent, becomes 



12 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

untenable. What, then, of the probabilities? It 
will surely suffice to point to the training of the 
officer in command. Rear-Admiral Uriu, having 
received his education in the Naval Academy at 
Annapolis, was moulded by the same influences, 
and had developed in him the same high sense of 
military honor and regard for international law, 
as those which contributed to the mental and 
moral equipment of your own Admiral Dewey 
and Admiral Sampson. And when this has been 
said, nothing more is needed to show that Rear- 
Admiral Uriu could not have acted otherwise at 
Chemulpo than he did. 

But there are other charges which the Russian 
government brings against Japan. One of them 
is that we began hostilities before making a for- 
mal declaration of war. Now on such a ground 
no civilized nation will ever think of offering 
protest. The principle involved is a plainly 
settled doctrine of international law. It is the 
earliest and best known proposition in every 
treatise on the subject. Not to know it argues 
ignorance of a fundamental principle concerning 
which there is absolutely no room for doubt. In 
all the years that have elapsed since the latter part 
of the eighteenth century to the present day it has 
been recognized in practice as well as in theory, 
that the declaration of war is an unnecessary pre- 
liminary to the making of war, and that hos- 
tilities may begin at any moment after diplomatic 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 13 

relations have been* severed. Nor are precedents 
wanting. The Russians themselves, the Ger- 
mans, the English, the United States, as well as 
the other European powers, have repeatedly 
begun hostilities before declaration of war. For 
a hundred years or more this principle has been 
accepted; and the supposition that Russia has 
any ground for complaint against Japan for the 
course she took last February rests on an assump- 
tion which is founded neither in the law nor in 
the facts. 

But it is said that the Russians have a right of 
appeal to international law in the circumstances 
of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur. 

They say that our ultimatum and the subse- 
quent withdrawal of our minister from St. Peters- 
burg left them no time in which to anticipate 
hostilities. They claim that Port Arthur was 
altogether unprepared. Now what of the dates? 
The attack complained of came on February 9, 
while diplomatic relations were severed on Feb- 
ruary 6, three days before. Two full days 
elapsed after our notification, during which no 
act of war was committed by Japan, though 
she was obviously entitled to open hostilities at 
any moment after the breaking off of diplomatic 
intercourse. What again of the alleged unpre- 
paredness of Russia? The official report on the 
doings at Port Arthur received from our Admiral 
shows that he found it difficult to get near the 



14 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

Russian squadron on account of the enemy using 
their search-lights; we were also informed that 
for some time before, as well as during our 
attack, the Russian battleships had their decks 
cleared for action, and were under a full head of 
steam. On our launching a torpedo, moreover, 
the Russians immediately opened fire upon us. 
This would alone suffice to dispose of the claim 
made by Russia, in her circular that " in this 
war Russia was taken by surprise," that '^ Russia 
was entirely unprepared." Instead of being 
unprepared, we have seen that she had ample 
time in which to make her dispositions for war 
on both land and sea. But we have special evi- 
dence of what she has been doing for the last 
seven months in the way of preparing for hos- 
tilities. Let me cite from a report on " Russian 
Preparations." 

" Her warlike preparations in the Far East have 
been going ahead since last April, when she failed 
to carry out her treaty engagements. During 
that time the increase made in her naval strength 
in the Far East was as follows: Three battle- 
ships, tonnage 38,488 ; one armored cruiser, ton- 
nage, 772^', five cruisers, tonnage 26,417; seven 
destroyers, tonnage, 2450; one gunboat, tonnage 
1344; two vessels for laying mines, tonnage 
6000. Total number of vessels nineteen, with a 
total tonnage of 82,415. In addition to these 
vessels, the Russian Government sent torpedo 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 15 

destroyers in sections by rail to Port Arthur, 
where the work of putting them together has been 
hastened, and seven of them have already been 
completed. Furthermore, two vessels of the vol- 
unteer fleet were armed at Vladivostok and 
hoisted the Russian naval ensign. 

" During the same period, the increase of 
Russia's land forces in the Far East has been 
equally marked. Since the 29th of last June, 
when under the pretext of trial transportation 
on the Siberian Railway, the Russian Government 
sent to China two infantry brigades, two artillery 
battalions, and a large force of cavalry. Troops 
have been constantly sent by military train from 
Russia to the Far East, until the Russian forces 
were over 40,000. At the same time, plans 
were being made for sending, if necessary, over 
200,000 more men. 

" During the same period there has been the 
greatest activity possible at Port Arthur and 
Vladivostok, and the work has been carried on 
day and night to strengthen the fortifications of 
those naval ports, while forts have been built at 
Liao Yang, Hunchun, and other strategic points, 
and large quantities of arms and ammunition 
have been sent to the Far East by the Siberian 
Railway and the vessels of the volunteer fleet. 
In the middle of October last, a train of fourteen 
cars was hurriedly sent from Russia laden with 
the equipment of a field hospital. 



i6 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

"During the latter part of January and up 
to the beginning of February, Russian military 
activity was still further intensified. On January 
21, about two battalions of infantry and a de- 
tachment of cavalry were sent from Port Arthur 
and Dalny to the northern frontier of Corea, and 
on January 28 a formal order to prepare for 
war was given by Admiral Alexieif to the forces 
which were stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu. 
On February i, the military commandant at 
Vladivostok, under the orders of his government, 
requested the Japanese commercial agent at that 
port to notify his nation that a state of siege 
might be proclaimed at any moment, and to make 
immediate preparations to withdraw to Habrovsk. 
About the same date all of the war ships at Port 
Arthur, except a battleship then under repairs, 
made a naval demonstration by leaving port, 
while troops were advanced in large numbers 
from Liao Yang toward the Yalu." 

Yet the Russian government said that Russia 
was unprepared. Does any sane man, after read- 
ing such reports as this, believe that Russia was 
unprepared? She had to such an extent utilized 
every moment she could gain as to give us the 
impression that she was deliberately pursuing the 
policy of delay only in order to have all the more 
opportunity for preparation, intending, the in- 
stant negotiations were broken off, to strike at 
Japan. It is in this way, knowing what prepara- 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 17 

tions she actually made, that we must construe 
her action. We cannot regard her plea of " un- 
preparedness " otherwise than as a game of bluff, 

— an attempt to gloss over her want of success 
after she has been defeated. 

Let me now pass to the consideration of some 
comparisons which have been instituted — in- 
vidiously and inappropriately, as it seems to me" 

— between Russia and Japan. Since the war 
began, the whole civilized world has directed its 
attention to the Far East, and from the general 
study that has resulted into the causes of the 
struggle there have emerged, along with predic- 
tions of the probable result, certain declarations 
as to the attitude people ought to take towards 
the combatants. We have had a great deal of 
opinion, and some of it, expressed by men in high 
social as well as political standing, takes the 
ground that the present war is a struggle between 
paganism and Christianity. Such men argue 
that, as Russia is a Christian nation, while Japan 
is pagan, it is the duty of the Christian peoples 

— of all Christendom in fact — to aid Russia in 
her effort to crush Japan. It is a matter of regret 
to me, even of sorrow, to hear any such views, 
for we Japanese are not fighting in the East 
for religion; we are battling against one of the 
greatest of the world powers for the peace of 
Asia, as well as for the national existence of 
Japan. 



i8 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

I ask you now to examine with me, in the light 
of the logic and the facts, this argument of the 
people who hold that Japan must be crushed 
because she is "pagan," for that is the charge 
against her, and Russia supported because she 
is Christian, for Christian she is alleged to be. 
What is paganism, and what is Christianity? 
And which of these two powers is enabled to 
bear the test that shall range it on the side of 
higher civilization ? Here I appeal to the candid 
judgment of any one present, on whatever side 
he may happen to be in his sympathies. First, let 
me say that the Japanese constitution, by special 
article, guarantees to every Japanese subject com- 
plete freedom of conscience and religion. In 
Japan the citizen is as free in religious matters 
as is the citizen in America, or in any country of 
Europe. While my country thus grants religious 
freedom to each of its citizens, it prevents no one 
from embracing the Christian faith, which is 
thus, politically speaking, tolerated. And now 
for the concrete illustrations. 

When the Variag went down in Chemulpo 
harbor, our officers found in the hull of that 
vessel a number of shipwrecked men. They re- 
clothed the bodies of the unfortunates, and then 
buried them ashore, in accordance with the rites 
of the Christian religion, the foreign missionary 
at Chemulpo being present by our invitation, as 
well as the members of the foreign consulate, 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 19 

to say nothing of the Japanese officers and sailors 
who attended the solemn ceremony. Meanwhile 
the wounded marines from the Variag had been 
transferred to our Red Cross Hospital in Japan, 
where they were attended to with the utmost 
care and kindness by our doctors and nurses. 
So impressed were the men by their treatment 
that some of them expressed their intention of 
remaining in Japan after the war was over, so 
that they might do some service for the country, 
and thus pay back the kindness shown to them in 
the hospital. These acts, on the part of Japan, 
were acknowledged by the Russian government, 
who sent us their message of thanks through the 
French Consul. 

Now contrast this treatment of Russians by 
Japan with the treatment meted out to Japanese 
residents in Manchuria, in Siberia, and at Vlad- 
ivostok by the Russians. I am sorry to find that 
an entirely different story; for our people in 
those places were maltreated, both by officials and 
civilians of Russian nationality; even when we 
sent a steamer to bring the Japanese home, the 
boat was detained without the slightest reason; 
while some of our compatriots were made to 
stand on the wharf shelterless, shivering with 
the cold, and lacking food. Now put the story 
of our treatment of the Russians against that of 
the Russian treatment of the Japanese, and ask 
yourselves, " Which is the Christian nation — 



20 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

Russia or Japan ? " I do not for a moment doubf 
what your answer will be. A moment's examin- 
ation of the facts will suffice to show that in this 
war it is we who have acted like Christians, and 
the Russians who have behaved like pagans. 

You remember the story in the New Testa- 
ment of the Good Samaritan. A traveller was 
attacked by a thief, was wounded and — his 
money and treasures stolen — left bleeding by 
the wayside. Presently a Christian came by and 
saw the traveller in his sorry condition, but 
passed on without saying a word or bestowing 
any attention upon the wounded man. After- 
wards came a Samaritan, who was a pagan. No 
sooner did he see the traveller bleeding by the 
wayside than he dismounted from his horse, 
bound up the man's wounds, and conveyed him to 
the nearest inn, where he paid all the expenses 
of attending to him and supplying him with 
medicine. Now Jesus heard that story of the 
Levite who was a Christian, and of the Samaritan 
who was a pagan, and what did he say? He 
could not but recognize that the deed of the 
Samaritan was a Christ-like deed, and this is 
well shown by his words ; for he said, " Go and 
do thou likewise ! " Well, in her treatment of 
the wounded sailors and the wounded soldiers, 
Japan acted as the Samaritan acted towards the 
traveller; and if Jesus were now upon earth he 
would say to Japan, "Thy deeds are Christ- 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 21 

like ! " Is anything more to be said, and can any- 
one fail to recognize which of the two nations is 
pagan, and which is Christian? All this reminds 
me of the saying of Madame Roland, which I 
met with in reading- the history of the French 
Revolution : " O Liberty, what crimes are com- 
mitted in thy name ! " and changing slightly 
that historic phrase, I myself am tempted to 
exclaim, " O Christianity, how many crimes are 
committed in thy name ! " And I say it is a most 
cruel and unchristian thing in this war to reserve 
the epithet of " pagan " for the Japanese, while 
you bestow the name of ^' Christian " upon the 
Russians. 

All I ask of reasonable and impartial men is 
that they shall study the facts as they are, and 
not allow themselves to be misled by merely sen- 
timental attacks on the nations of the East. I 
want them to realize that in those so-called pagan 
nations there are men and women whose hearts 
throb with the same human sympathies, and 
whose minds acknowledge the same principles 
of right and wrong that we find among the people 
of the United States. The Japanese may differ 
from the American in longitude and in race * 
history, but they have essentially the same emo- 
tions and the same methods of reasoning, — a 
fact which will be scarcely denied by those who 
believe that " of one blood " were made " all 
nations of the earth." 



22 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

Let us now consider what has been called " the 
yellow peril," — a phrase of which I have heard 
and seen much since the outbreak of this war. 
What do they mean when they talk of the " yel- 
low peril " ? They mean that when Japan be- 
comes supreme in the Orient she will unite under 
her banner all the peoples of Asia, and that 
through this combination Europe will be threat- 
ened by a peril which is called " yellow," because 
it will array the so-called " yellow " races against 
the races that are white. And they argue that, 
however just the cause of Japan may be in her 
struggle against Russia, Europe must not merely 
do nothing in the way of sympathizing with or 
helping her, but must side with Russia and aid 
her in so defeating and crushing Japan that she 
will never again be able to rise as an independent 
power. Here is another cruel conclusion reached 
from no basis of actuality or fact. Look for a 
moment at the origin of the phrase " yellow 
peril." It was manufactured by a certain treach- 
erous diplomat and politician in order to arouse 
feelings of fear as well as the passion of hatred 
among the peoples of the West at the expense of 
the Japanese. Let me therefore remind you of 
the true history of the only " yellow peril " the 
world has ever had. For there was once a " yel- 
low peril," and the nations suffered from it. The 
first " yellow peril " in history was the inva- 
sion of Europe by the Mongolians in the year 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 23 

1241 A.D. Penetrating to Moscow, they contin- 
ued their march into Austria, and swarmed into 
other parts of Europe, devastating and plunder- 
ing wherever they went. After thus terrorizing 
Europe and ravaging its eastern territories, the 
Mongols directed their course to Japan. They 
reached our islands in 1268, and the results of the 
" yellow peril '' there were far more terrible than 
any which Europe had experienced. For thir- 
teen years subsequent to that date, up to 1281, 
we had the " yellow peril " with us in its most 
menacing form; at one time the Mongolians 
were in actual occupation of our northern coast. 
During the period of their stay they burned our 
villages, killed our women and children, and 
plundered us of our treasures, not leaving a sin- 
gle conceivable act of wickedness uncommitted. 
Such was the terror inspired by the "yellow 
peril " as we knew it, that even to-day in Japan 
it is customary to stop children from crying by 
telling them that the yellow man or the Mongol 
will get them. All the while the Japanese people 
resisted the invaders, and the patriotic defence 
of their country by our warriors enabled us to 
utterly rout and defeat the enemy, with the 
slaughter of 100,000 Mongolians, only three of 
whom were permitted to return to their homes 
alive. When, therefore, we hear people talk of 
the ''yellow peril" in the East, with obvious 
reference to Japan, we are bound to reply by ask- 



24 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

ing who it was that, by the gallantry of its people, 
crushed back the tide of Mongolian invasion, and 
saved Europe from the fiendish wickedness of the 
only " yellow peril " which the world has ever 
known? And if, ignoring the fact that Japan 
was thus once the saviour of Europe when 
Europe did not even know who had saved her, 
both Europe and America agree in fearing a 
modern '' yellow peril," then I assert, without the 
slightest chance of being successfully contra- 
dicted, that Japan has far more reason to fear 
a " white " peril in the East than the world, or 
any part of it, has to anticipate danger from 
Japan. Observe the advance of the European 
nations into Asia. What are the extension of 
French Tonquin and the occupation of Kiow- 
Chan by Germany if not " white perils " for the 
Chinese empire ? There is another " white peril " 
for China on her northern border in Russia's 
occupation of Manchuria, but it is far more of 
a " white peril " for Japan. We regard it as a 
real and dangerous menace to our national exist- 
ence, not for a moment imaginary in character 
like the " yellow peril " now so much talked about 
in Europe and America. The phrase about the 
" yellow peril " — and I say it emphatically — is 
thus nothing more than a trick concocted by dis- 
ingenuous and treacherous diplomats, not merely 
to disturb and bring to an end the cordial feelings 
which characterize the relations towards us of 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 25 

the United States and England, but also to substi- 
tute for such feelings an attitude of antipathy on 
the part of those powers. 

A glance now at the general situation. We are 
fighting this battle with no purpose of menacing 
Europe and America with any " yellow peril." 
Nor are we fighting for either race interests or 
religious interests. We are fighting to preserve 
the national existence of Japan, menaced as it is 
by the territorial aggrandizements of Russia, and 
by the aggressions she is continually making 
upon the frontiers and borders which our inter- 
ests compel us to protect. Inspired by no war- 
like ambition, and no desire for the acquirement 
of new territory, Japan simply seeks in the pres- 
ent war to maintain the peace of Asia and con- 
serve the influence of Anglo-American civilization 
in the East. These statements of mine find con- 
firmation in the widely contrasted powers and 
resources of the two belligerents. Take first 
the matter of population. In Russia there are 
140,000,000, while Japan has only 45,000,000. 
Russia, again, has a standing army numbering 
4,600,000; the military forces of Japan do not 
exceed 675,000. Vastly superior also is Russia's 
naval equipment, represented by a tonnage of 
488,000, whereas the tonnage of Japan's navy 
does not exceed 252,000. So far as actual fight- 
ing power and population are concerned, Japan 
is evidently no match for Russia, while in other 



26 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

ways the resources of Russia are far superior 
to those of Japan. How, then, for the mere grat- 
ification of warHke ambition, or for the mere 
purposes of aggrandizement, could a small island 
power like Japan dare to face that gigantic and 
mightiest of the world powers, — Russia ? It is 
evident that Japan would not go to war with such 
a power unless she were fighting for her very 
existence as a nation. 

A word here about the commercial issues of the 
war. " What," I have heard people ask, " would 
happen if Japan were victorious in this war ? " 
Becoming supreme in the East, would she not 
threaten the commerce of the world ? In other 
words, would she not drive all Europeans and 
Americans from the continent of Asia and thus 
appropriate its commerce to her own selfish pur- 
poses ? " The reply to such questions as these 
may be easily obtained by anybody who will study 
the history of the Japanese Empire during the 
past fifty years, nothing more being needed to 
show how unfounded are such apprehensions 
than a knowledge of the policy and progress of 
Japan in that period. 

Just fifty-one years ago President Fillmore, of 
the United States, sent Commodore Perry to 
Japan. He took a message advising the Japanese 
to adopt the " open door " policy as regarded 
intercourse with other nations, honestly as well 
as earnestly urging upon Japan that this was the 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 27 

best course for her to pursue. It was also repre- 
sented to Japan that if she allowed the oppor- 
tunity to pass, some other power might compel 
her, at the point of the bayonet or at the cannon's 
mouth, to open her ports. Finally, by means of 
the gentle suasion and advice which the United 
States brought to bear, Japan was induced to 
adopt the " open door " policy, which was for- 
ever accepted and established for Japan by the 
Emperor on his ascension to the throne in 1868. 
In his imperial oath the Emperor made this 
declaration : " Henceforth we shall seek knowl- 
edge and wisdom in the civilized world, and es- 
tablish a national assembly where all the affairs 
of state are to be decided by pubhc opinion.'' 
The advance which Japan was making became yet 
more evident after the imperial restoration of 
1868, when we recognized the various depart- 
ments of government, the educational system, the 
postal and telegraphic system, the sanitary sys- 
tem, the army and navy, — all these reorganized 
anew, that is to say, according to the principles of 
western civilization. To crown all, constitutional 
government was established for Japan in 1890, 
and ever since all Japanese subjects have enjoyed 
to the fullest extent the same civil, political, and 
religious liberty as is granted in the freest nations 
of the civilized world. 

Now, after having thus adopted western civili- 
zation and assimilated our manners and customs 



28 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

to those of the most advanced nations, we felt 
it our duty to do our utmost to extend these bless- 
ings to other oriental nations whom we could 
influence. Having ourselves benefited from the 
acquirements and experiences of the western 
countries, we felt ourselves bound in return to 
urge upon Korea and China, as the United States 
had urged upon us, the wisdom of adopting the 
" open door " policy towards foreign nations, that 
being the only policy by which an enlightened 
people could hope to advance along the path of 
self-development, at once securing its own well- 
being and contributing to maintain peace in the 
continent of Asia. We have made these repre- 
sentations to Korea and China for thirty years 
past, and have noted with satisfaction that the 
policy of the United States in Manchuria is prac- 
tically identical with the policy of the Japanese 
government. Japan is really acting as the pioneer 
of Anglo-American civilization in the East. It 
is for this which we are fighting, and only this 
which is the meaning of the war. 

I shall now say something about Russia's 
promises, and remind you of how she failed to 
fulfil them. We have only to examine her atti- 
tude towards the Manchurian question to find her 
declaring repeatedly her willingness to acknowl- 
edge the independence and integrity of China. 
As to Manchuria, the Russian government prom- 
ised Japan as well as the American and European 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 29 

governments that she would evacuate the prov- 
ince on October 8, 1903. Fully believing that she 
would fulfil the undertaking, the United States 
and Japan signed a treaty with China, of date 
October 6, — just two days before the anticipated 
evacuation, — to open Mukden and Antung to 
the commerce of the world. Russia had, by 
formal agreement, pledged her solemn word of 
honor to evacuate Manchuria on October 8, and 
as she calls herself a Christian nation we believed 
we could trust her implicitly; nor did we doubt 
for a moment that she would obey one of the 
ten commandments, which says, " Thou shall not 
bear false witness against thy neighbor." We 
did not suppose for an instant that she would 
break her agreement. Yet October 8 came round, 
and Russia did not evacuate Manchuria. Instead 
of evacuating the province, she actually increased 
her armaments there. Now, having failed to 
keep the commandment which warns against 
bearing false witness against one's neighbor, how 
dare she claim to be called a Christian nation? 
That she can keep on regarding herself as 
Christian, and that others can keep on calling her 
Christian, is to me a puzzle. 

Why did she not keep her promise, solemnly 
made by the agreement to the United States and 
Japan? The reason was clearly stated in the 
March number of the " Journal of the American 
Asiatic Association." You may remember that 



30 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

before the evacuation of Manchuria a secret 
negotiation was carried on by M. Plangon with 
the Chinese government at Pekin, and that was 
afterwards followed up by M. Lessar, the Russian 
Minister. The " Journal " says : " The chief de- 
mands made by M. Plangon were that no portion 

u of Chinese territory in Manchuria should be 
alienated or even sold or leased to any other but 
Russians; and that no new ports should be 
opened in Manchuria to foreign commerce, or 
consuls received there, without previous consul- 
tation with the Russian government. M. Lessar 
repeated the first of these demands, and added to 
it a further demand that after the evacuation at 
Manchuria all forestry, mining, and other similar 
valuable concessions should be granted only to 
Russian subjects." 

The meaning of Russia's Manchurian policy 
is no longer a secret. Her aim was to dominate 
the province, to exclude from it all foreigners, 
and then to exploit it in her own selfish interests. 
It is equally clear that if Russia ever becomes 
supreme in Manchuria, no " open door " policy 

* will ever be allowed sway there. After Russia 
has been permitted to obtain undivided suprem- 
acy in Manchuria, it will be impossible for the 
free commercial intercourse contemplated by 
the United States and Japan to assert itself in the 
province from which Russia pledged herself to 
withdraw. Nor is this all. According to Russian 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 31 

law, while a foreign corporation in Russian ter- 
ritory can be sued by the Russians in her courts, 
they cannot sue Russian subjects or Russian 
companies in the same way. Therefore, in case 
Manchuria becomes Russian territory, all rights 
to sue in the courts will be denied to such foreien 
corporations as happen to be carrying on business 
in the province. Then, again, what will be the 
future of the religious works? If Manchuria 
passes into Russian hands, no Catholic or Prot- 
estant missionary will be permitted to do religious 
work there. Only last year, according to a report 
from the province, the Russian government very 
diplomatically requested CathoHc and Protestant 
missionaries to withdraw from Manchuria and 
betake themselves into the territory of China 
proper, lest the very presence of foreign mission- 
aries be a future cause of the outbreaks of anti- 
foreign bandits. Into a Russian Manchuria, you 
may depend upon it, no missionary will ever bes 
admitted, in spite of the fact that missionaries 
have been carrying on religious work here for the 
past fifty years. Consider the amount of time, 
energy^, and money that has been expended in 
missionary effort in both China and Japan. The 
Episcopal Asiatic Mission has already spent, up 
to the present, in the spiritual elevation of the 
oriental people, a sum amounting to $4,166,000. 
Nor does the significance of this sum grow less 
when it is remembered that the Episcopal mis- 



32 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

sionaries are not especially active in the East. 
Other denominations are much more enterprising, 
and it is a fair estimate to say that the cost of 
their missionary work in the Far East cannot be 
less than from $30,000,000 to $100,000,000. Let 
Korea and Manchuria once fall into the power of 
Russia, and the day of mission work in those 
territories is ®ver, to say nothing of the involved 
loss of the immense amount of money and energy 
which were devoted to the opening up of Man- 
churia and Korea and China to the Christian 
religion. Just at the time when the missions are 
about to reap the fruit of those investments, 
Russia steps in and declares that whatever 
devotion, treasure, and time have been put 
into religious elevation of the East, it shall 
have no harvest, so far as she has the power to 
determine. 

And now to sum up. This war, let me repeat, 
is neither racial nor religious in character. It is 
a battle for Japan's national existence ; a struggle 
for the advancement of Anglo-American civ- 
ilization in the East; a war undertaken to in- 
sure the peace of Asia. It is this temper and 
spirit that inspire her whole people. The feeling 
aroused throughout the empire by our just war 
is shown by the fact, that when the government 
issued its war loan, the amount was subscribed 
for five times over. Moreover, from all the 
parts of our Island Empire, the contributions to 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST ss 

the war fund have come in, — first by gift of the 
Emperor's gold chest, and then followed by the 
ancient Daimio nobility, and the wealthy classes. 
The farmer, the laborer, the tradesman, and the 
servant have eagerly handed in their savings. 
The very school children, hoarding up their 
pocket money, and adding to it the small 
sums given to them by their parents for the 
purchase of books or school implements, have 
also carried their offerings to the treasury de- 
partment. This war will be long and terrible, 
and the whole people are ready for it. This 
is shown by the fact that when a soldier or 
sailor is sent to the front, his family is taken 
care of by his neighbors or by his village 
community. Landlords have made it a rule not 
to collect the rent from his family, and doctors 
have volunteered to treat the sick in his family 
without charge. 

Furthermore, in anticipation of many thousand 
widows and orphans who must be left behind, 
we established a relief fund association to which 
contributions amounting to $1,300,000 have al- 
ready been made. 

If Japan is defeated, there can be no future 
in the Orient for Christianity and Civilization. 
If Russia wins, the light of Religion and Free- 
dom will fade out from that part of the world 
forever. It is for these reasons that the little 
nation of Japan, knowing well the giant might 
3 



34 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

of the foe she has to face, is nerved, for the sake 
of freedom and civiHzation, with their heritage 
and promise of all that she holds most dear, to 
wage the present struggle to the last gasp of her 
endurance and her life. 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 35 



[The following is the comment on Baron 
Kaneko's address, which appeared in the edi- 
torial of the " Boston Herald," May 2, 1904. 

— Ed.] 

A Japanese Public Speaker. 

Such dear lovers of human speech in every 
shape of oratory are Americans, and so fond of 
analyzing and comparing the varied methods it 
resorts to, as to make it sure that the bare 
announcement of an address in Sanders Theatre, 
Cambridge, from so distinguished a Japanese 
statesman and jurist as Baron Kaneko, should, 
last Thursday evening, have gathered an excep- 
tionally intelligent and thoughtful audience. 
Baron Kaneko was not there on the platform as 
immediate invited guest of Harvard University, 

— which, under existing circumstances, might 
not have been deemed internationally proper 
on the part of a great educational institution, 

— but as the invited guest of the Japan Club of 
Harvard, an association of patriotic young 
Japanese students of the college, along with a 
goodly number of their American fellow-students, 
warmly sympathizing with their national aspira- 
tions in this present crisis of their country's fate. 

It was, however, well known that, though a 
son of the " Land of the Rising Sun," Baron 



36 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

Kaneko was also a graduate of Harvard. " Blood 
is thicker than water," — especially academic 
blood, ruddy with the red globules of football, 
the classics. Chief Justice Story, and ever revered 
Professor Langdale of the Cambridge law school. 
Besides, all knew that even before he was a 
baron Harvard had decorated Kentaro Kaneko 
for his distinguished services to his country 
with its own highest university honors. So, of 
course, all this did not in the least prejudice the 
minds of those present against anything he might 
have to say, or tend to muffle their hands in the 
resonance of their tumultuous claps. 

How a speaker lives up to the subject and the 
occasion he takes in hand is the supreme test of an 
orator, or better yet, of the stamp of man he is in 
himself. Does he magnify or belittle his subject; 
does he Uft it or degrade it? In reality, — call 
it anything one will, — an address to a club of 
Harvard Japanese students or what not, — this 
was in essence the pathetic plea for justice and 
mercy on the part of one bleeding nation menaced 
with brutal annihilation to another fair-play- 
loving nation, strong in the possession of its own 
inalienable rights. It is a theme one rarely hears 
treated in such a presence, involving as it does 
depth of passion seldom stirring the heart of a 
speaker. The simple occasion, then, was silently 
eloquent enough in itself to pre-enUst the sym- 
pathies of the assemblage. 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 37 

Baron Kaneko's address furnished a rare 
opportunity to test the truth of the frequent 
assertion that repressed emotion acts more pow- 
erfully on others than that which seeks free vent 
in outcry ; as, with the bereaved, the " tearless 
grief " that agitates more sensibly than floods of 
tears. By the deep-seated law of contraries, re- 
pressed emotion quickens the imagination of the 
onlooker to supply out of his own feelings that 
the lack of which is cravingly felt, and all such 
natively self-evoked emotion works more vitally 
than that which is prompted from without. 
Shakespeare's famous speech of Mark Antony 
over Caesar's body is one long illustration of how 
the nearest way to set afire the passions of the 
Forum mob lies through such seemingly listless 
repression of the speaker's own, that, like a 
whirlwind fiercely rushing in to fill a vacuum, 
the cries and execrations of the populace will 
soon be heard rending the air in irrepressible 
wrath to do their own cursing for themselves, — 
always more enjoyable than having another do 
it for one. 

From beginning to end — and it was nearly 
two hours long — Baron Kaneko's address was 
free from every trace of rhetorical declamation 
or vindictive passion, and was, on the external 
surface, the straightforward, logical discussion 
by a jurist and statesman of the points at issue 
between Japan and Russia. The speaker himself, 



38 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

slight in figure, with an intellectual head and a 
face as sad as Hamlet's, confined himself to 
cold statistics more damning — as the audience 
seemed to feel — in their rebuttal of the claims 
of Russia than any amount of fiery invective. 
The naive and innocent surprise of the Russian 
bear up-stream, and seated on a trembling ava- 
lanche of forts, siege guns, infantry, and Cossack 
cavalry, at having the peaceful waters disturbed 
for him by the Japanese lamb down-stream, was 
simply shown to have been an illogical surprise 
on his part, in view of the stupendous preparation 
he had made ahead against the possibility of any 
power with such little pattering feet so agitating 
the waters that they could be forced to run up 
hill. Still, all this was left as simple deduction to 
the mind of the hearer. The speaker never called 
Russia a bear, or Japan a lamb, or either of 
them by any such diplomatically discourteous or 
piously Pharisaical a name. If the hearer felt 
inclined to indulge in any such ^sopian epithets, 
it must be solely on his own hook, and on the 
score of purely unimpassioned statistics which 
should seem to him to furnish ample warrant for 
swearing on strictly rational premises. 

In this first illustration the keynote was struck 
of Baron Kaneko's method and manner of speech. 
Considering, moreover, the finesse with which it 
had to be done, and done, too, in a foreign 
tongue, in the use of which he had for twenty- 



THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 39 

five years been out of practice, his success was 
truly remarkable. Thi§ style once adopted, the 
speaker never departed from it from start to 
finish. Though all felt what a lava flood of 
passion underlay the man, all that betrayed it 
revealed itself through the one note of subtle, 
evanescent, illusive irony inspired by statistics, 
and felt all the more in that it was not palpably 
expressed. Statistics, thus handled, may be 
made as inflaming as Pindaric odes. Thus, for 
example, in rebuttal of the plea that, in this war, 
the sympathies of Europe and America ought to 
be with Russia, because it was a war of Chris- 
tianity against paganism, the delicate statistical 
irony with which he presented comparative tables 
of the way in which the Russians treated the poor 
Japanese wretches who fell into their hands at 
Vladivostok, and that in which the Japanese had 
treated the Russians in like plight, — and then, 
in comment on what Jesus himself regarded as 
genuine Christianity, recited the parable of the 
Good Samaritan, priest, levite, or pagan, — this 
summed up all the speaker had to say on purely 
doctrinal subjects. The statistics themselves 
became a touching parable. 

But the quiet way in which Baron Kaneko 
locked tight, with a like statistical key of a hun- 
dred wards, what is called '' The Open Door of 
the East," should Russia come to prevail, — 
locked it tight against missionaries, Catholic or 



m 



40 THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 

Protestant, against consuls, shippers, mine own- 
ers, business enterprises, schools, and colleges, — 
was the crowning masterpiece of a lock-out that 
would fairly have left a bank safe manufacturer 
aghast at being thus beaten at his own trade. 
The way in which the dry bones of statistics 
became a skeleton key was a marvel. 

Here, then, exemplified in Baron Kaneko, was 
a style of illusive public speaking that makes the 
hearer say what the speaker omits to say, which 
ought to have proved vastly instructive to the 
college boys, not to say to some of their profes- 
sors in the rhetorical department. In its indirect 
directness was it Japanese in spirit? If so, 
Shakespeare's Mark Antony was a passed master 
in Japanese methods. 



